Until now a version that renames or drops a key did not fail — it silently
ignored what it no longer understood, and the effect surfaced as a build
doing the wrong thing. Both directions of that happened within two days:
a branch config using `??:00` on a GitTally that did not know it yet, and a
`builds.maxConcurrent` that had moved to another section.
gitTally:
version:
since: "0.9.18" # enforced
below: "2.0" # release marker; GitTally decides how strictly
There is deliberately no version of the file format (no `apiVersion`): no API
is involved — GitTally reads its own configuration — and only one generation
is ever supported. The declaration exists to make an incompatibility
nameable, never to run two parsers.
`since` is hard in both directions. Too new a requirement is refused, and so
is a file written before the version in which the configuration format last
broke (`ConfigVersions.FORMAT_BROKE_IN`, empty for now) — that check needs no
declared ceiling, because GitTally knows its own breaking changes.
`below` is the team's release marker and only warns: an unmaintained caution
value must never stop a CI. The routine it serves is the one known from IDE
plugins — new version, warning, try it, then raise the marker and commit.
The reach of a violation follows the layer: the machine and project configs
abort the start naming the file and the rollback, while an incompatible
branch config fails only that branch's builds. A branch cut before a
migration must not stop the server or hold up the branches that are fine.
A file that declares nothing keeps working, and the CLI prints one line
instead of a stack trace.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
`atTimes: ["??:05"]` runs a build five past every hour. The pattern expands
to its 24 concrete slots before the due-slot match, so each hour is its own
slot in the trigger state and fires once — the existing per-slot semantics
carry over unchanged, including that only the latest due slot of a day
triggers and that a slot whose pool is still building is retried until it
starts.
Only the hour may be a wildcard; anything else is skipped with a warning.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The concurrency limit moved to executor.maxConcurrent without an alias, so
the old key binds a scalar where a build definition belongs and failed the
whole configuration. But that configuration is committed in the watched
repository, and a repository's master is not always changeable right away —
an installation must not be stuck on a key it is meant to forget.
A `builds` entry that is not a mapping is now dropped with a warning (once
per key, the config is loaded every poll cycle), naming executor.maxConcurrent
for the key that moved.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A branch's committed .gittally.yml describes that branch's CI, so it wins
over the project and repo-install config — the `builds` section included.
Pinning it was wrong: a new build definition can only be tried out by
committing it on a branch, and pinned it neither took effect at build time
nor existed for the watcher, so the job silently never ran.
The watcher now decides per branch from that branch's own definitions,
reading its committed config via `git show` and caching it by head commit,
so the read happens only when the branch moved; an unreadable config falls
back to the primary definitions instead of failing the poll cycle. A
branch's definitions are evaluated for that branch alone, so a definition
committed on one branch can never trigger builds of another.
The pinned set is reduced to what does not describe this branch's build:
secrets (`git`), the host and repository sections (`server`, `gitea`,
`executor`, `watcher`), the sandbox policy (`docker.enabled`/`network`),
and the trust gate (`requirePullRequest`). Letting a branch set its own
build command through a definition grants no new power — `branches.*.
buildCommand` always allowed exactly that — while the sandbox and the gate
decide whether untrusted branch code runs on the host at all.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
builds.maxConcurrent mixed an execution setting into the build
definitions as a reserved key. The limit now lives in the new executor
section (pinned like the builds section, enforced for all builds
regardless of trigger), default 1, without a compatibility alias — a
leftover builds.maxConcurrent key is rejected as an invalid build
definition. Recorded as a follow-up in ADR 0007.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
ADR 0007: the YAML builds section (next to the reserved maxConcurrent
key) defines named builds (jobs) with onPush/atTimes triggers, branch
selectors (name globs, activeWithin age filter), and build-setting
overrides applied last over the merged branch config. The implicit
default build (onPush over all branches) preserves the previous
behavior; the section is pinned against the worktree layer.
Results record the job name; restart, retry, and startup recovery
re-run by it, resolving settings from the current config. A non-default
build records under the <branch>@<build> pool with its own row,
retention count, and permanent latest-green link.
branches.*.autoBuild stays as a deprecated alias (plain times only);
the unreleased-in-practice v0.9.13 per-slot buildCommand/name syntax is
removed again.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A branches.<name>.autoBuild.times entry is now either a plain HH:MM
string or an object with time, its own buildCommand, and a name, so a
nightly slot can run a fuller check than the on-commit builds. The
watcher passes the slot's command and name to the executor, persisted in
the build result — UI restarts, gittally retry, and the startup recovery
repeat a build with the command and name it originally ran under.
A named slot (e.g. master@nightly) gets its own pool: repository
grouping, retention count, branches-view row (sorted after its branch),
latest status, and permanent latest-green artifact link are keyed by the
build name, while origin lookups, gone-branch pruning, worktrees, and
Gitea links/statuses stay keyed by the real branch. Without a name,
slot builds share the branch's pool as before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Build worktrees share the primary checkout's .git, so build tools can read
refs/heads there. Since the rewrite never moved those refs, they stayed frozen at
the last checkout: hs.hsadmin.ng's prQuickCheck compares master with
origin/master and therefore failed every build once origin moved on.
The sync runs after the enqueue decision on purpose — a local ref lagging behind
origin is exactly how the watcher recognizes new commits, so keeping the refs in
sync earlier (cron job, mirroring refspec, or this step moved up) would silence
the branch instead of building it.
Fast-forward only, as a compare-and-swap against the commit just read: diverged
or ahead branches stay untouched, and the checked-out branch is advanced with
merge --ff-only, which refuses to overwrite conflicting uncommitted changes.
Switched off with watcher.fastForwardLocalRefs: false.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes TODO 2 of the security audit in docs/prs/2026-07-08-PR#000.
Every rendered page carried the live control token in a meta tag so that
gittally.js could send it, but no GET is authenticated — so `curl … |
grep gittally-control-token` handed the token to anyone, and read access
was effectively write access.
Reading stays fully public, which is a requirement rather than an
oversight: build states, logs and artifacts must be linkable from Gitea,
chats or tickets without a login. Only the distribution of the token
changed. The meta tag is gone; gittally.js keeps the token in
localStorage and asks for it once per browser, so knowing it requires
shell access to `.git/gittally/control-token` on the host. A token the
server rejects is dropped and asked for once more, so a rotated secret is
not a dead end. As a request header it stays inherently CSRF-safe.
The five branches of that flow (first use, reuse, stale token, cancelled
prompt, wrong token twice) were exercised against the real source with a
throwaway node harness; the UI test now asserts the token does not appear
in the rendered page. `docs/deployment.md` gained a "Control Token"
section on the public-read/token-protected-write split.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Finishes the small items of the security audit in
docs/prs/2026-07-08-PR#000: TODO 3, 4 and 7.
The three mutating endpoints of BuildsApiController no longer accept the
control token as a `token` query parameter — only the X-GitTally-Token
header, which the bundled UI has always used. URLs end up in access logs,
proxy logs, browser history and Referer headers, and the token never
expires, so a historical log capture would yield a valid credential.
`config:print` masks git.token as `***` on both the raw and the --full
path and names the new --show-secrets flag in a leading YAML comment, so
the output stays parseable when piped. The setup script points at
--show-secrets where it used to steer the operator to the plain token.
`server.bindAddress` now defaults to 127.0.0.1: neither the UI nor the
API authenticates read access, so reaching GitTally should require the
host's reverse proxy. Existing .gittally.yml files keep their explicit
value; the managed nginx container needs `0.0.0.0` set deliberately,
which is noted in the release notes, docs/configuration.md and
docs/deployment.md.
Released as v0.9.9, which also carries the previous two commits.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two fixes from the vm4006 rollout (docs/plan/16-git-in-docker-builds.md):
Rootless daemons map the host user to container root, so running the build
container as --user <host-uid> put it into the subuid range and it could not
even create .gradle in a fresh worktree (legacy only worked because its
ownership-repair chown had accidentally moved build/ and .gradle/ into subuid
ownership in its reused primary checkout). The container now always runs as
--user 0: the unprivileged host user under rootless, real root under rootful
where the ownership repair still applies; under rootless it degenerates to 0:0.
Git now works inside build containers: the primary .git is mounted read-only
with .git/gittally/ masked by an empty tmpfs (git.token and the control token
stay unreachable, the workspace bind resurfaces only the build's own worktree)
and the worktree admin dir mounted read-write for index-refreshing commands.
Verified on vm4006: git log/status succeed, the machine config is invisible,
ref writes fail on the read-only mount.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
