deployment.md only said "replace the jar and restart", which left out the
runtime-bundle case entirely — including the trap that the tarball
unpacks to a `gittally/` directory and must not be extracted over ~/opt.
Both variants now list the actual commands, with a rollback copy and the
note that a restart is safe because in-flight builds are re-enqueued.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The watched projects (GitTally and hs.hsadmin.ng) are open source, keep
no secrets in the repository and build against test data, so credentials
appearing in a log are fixtures. The builds neither deploy nor sign; the
only planned artifact is a jar. Public logs are also the point: a red
build has to be diagnosable from the link in the Gitea status without a
login.
Recorded as a property of the watched project rather than of GitTally —
deployment.md now says that an installation whose builds touch real
credentials has to stay off the public internet, since GitTally offers no
per-endpoint gating.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes TODO 2 of the security audit in docs/prs/2026-07-08-PR#000.
Every rendered page carried the live control token in a meta tag so that
gittally.js could send it, but no GET is authenticated — so `curl … |
grep gittally-control-token` handed the token to anyone, and read access
was effectively write access.
Reading stays fully public, which is a requirement rather than an
oversight: build states, logs and artifacts must be linkable from Gitea,
chats or tickets without a login. Only the distribution of the token
changed. The meta tag is gone; gittally.js keeps the token in
localStorage and asks for it once per browser, so knowing it requires
shell access to `.git/gittally/control-token` on the host. A token the
server rejects is dropped and asked for once more, so a rotated secret is
not a dead end. As a request header it stays inherently CSRF-safe.
The five branches of that flow (first use, reuse, stale token, cancelled
prompt, wrong token twice) were exercised against the real source with a
throwaway node harness; the UI test now asserts the token does not appear
in the rendered page. `docs/deployment.md` gained a "Control Token"
section on the public-read/token-protected-write split.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Finishes the small items of the security audit in
docs/prs/2026-07-08-PR#000: TODO 3, 4 and 7.
The three mutating endpoints of BuildsApiController no longer accept the
control token as a `token` query parameter — only the X-GitTally-Token
header, which the bundled UI has always used. URLs end up in access logs,
proxy logs, browser history and Referer headers, and the token never
expires, so a historical log capture would yield a valid credential.
`config:print` masks git.token as `***` on both the raw and the --full
path and names the new --show-secrets flag in a leading YAML comment, so
the output stays parseable when piped. The setup script points at
--show-secrets where it used to steer the operator to the plain token.
`server.bindAddress` now defaults to 127.0.0.1: neither the UI nor the
API authenticates read access, so reaching GitTally should require the
host's reverse proxy. Existing .gittally.yml files keep their explicit
value; the managed nginx container needs `0.0.0.0` set deliberately,
which is noted in the release notes, docs/configuration.md and
docs/deployment.md.
Released as v0.9.9, which also carries the previous two commits.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Port of the legacy host's docker-prune.timer: 02:00 host time,
Persistent=true, docker system prune -af — but without --volumes, so
the per-repository Gradle cache volumes survive. The units are
host-global; several GitTally instances share one timer.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Investigating six near-simultaneous builds on vm4006 showed no duplicate
enqueue: they were six distinct recently-active origin branches, each built
once by the documented new-origin-branch rule (in a fresh clone every origin
branch counts as new). The watcher already guards against duplicates per
branch and per commit, with test coverage; only the first-start behavior was
undocumented.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
./gradlew runtimeBundle packs a jlink-trimmed JRE, gittally.jar, and a
launcher script into one tarball, unpacked to ~/opt/gittally on the target
host; init --systemd works from the bundle unchanged because java.home and
the running-jar path resolve into it. Chosen over a GraalVM native image
(Spring AOT evaluates bean conditions at build time, which cannot represent
the dual-context CLI/server wiring) and over a containerized runtime — see
ADR 0006 and docs/plan/15-runtime-bundle-distribution.md, which also records
the full vm2176-to-vm4006 migration walkthrough.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
mhoennig