Harden secret-file creation, token comparison and git refname args

Works off the security audit in docs/prs/2026-07-08-PR#000: TODO 1, 8, 9
and 10, the four items that need no design decision.

New `SecretFiles` creates files holding secrets with mode 0600 and their
directories with 0700 *at creation*, as a file attribute, instead of
writing at the umask default and chmod-ing afterwards — that left a
window in which the Gitea token was world-readable, which matters on a
multi-tenant host. It is used by `init` for .git/gittally/.gittally.yml
and by `ControlTokenService` for the control token; the shell setup
script now writes its YAML in a `umask 077` subshell for the same reason.

`ControlTokenService.matches` hashes both sides with SHA-256 before
`MessageDigest.isEqual`, so the comparison always runs over two 32-byte
buffers and cannot return early on a length mismatch.

`GitService.checkout` and `fetchBranch` pass `--` before the refname, so
a branch named like an option cannot be read as one. `resetHardToOrigin`
keeps its plain form: `git reset --hard -- <commit>` is rejected outright
and its argument is already `origin/`-prefixed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
mhoennig
2026-08-11 07:09:34 +02:00
co-authored by Claude
parent 3eb41d4c66
commit dea6770998
8 changed files with 115 additions and 30 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
package de.hoennig.gittally
import java.nio.ByteBuffer
import java.nio.file.Files
import java.nio.file.Path
import java.nio.file.StandardOpenOption
import java.nio.file.attribute.PosixFilePermissions
/**
* Creation of files and directories that hold secrets — the Gitea token in
* `.git/gittally/.gittally.yml` and the control token.
*
* The permissions are set *at creation*, never with a `chmod` after the write:
* writing at the umask default first (typically `0644`) would leave a window in
* which the secret is world-readable, which matters on multi-tenant hosts.
* On non-POSIX filesystems the permissions are silently skipped.
*/
object SecretFiles {
private val OWNER_ONLY_FILE = PosixFilePermissions.asFileAttribute(PosixFilePermissions.fromString("rw-------"))
private val OWNER_ONLY_DIRECTORY = PosixFilePermissions.asFileAttribute(PosixFilePermissions.fromString("rwx------"))
/** Writes [content] as a `0600` file, replacing an existing file. */
fun writeOwnerOnly(
file: Path,
content: String,
) {
val bytes = content.toByteArray()
Files.deleteIfExists(file)
try {
Files
.newByteChannel(file, setOf(StandardOpenOption.CREATE_NEW, StandardOpenOption.WRITE), OWNER_ONLY_FILE)
.use { it.write(ByteBuffer.wrap(bytes)) }
} catch (_: UnsupportedOperationException) {
Files.write(file, bytes)
}
}
/** Creates [directory] and its parents; a directory created here gets mode `0700`. */
fun createDirectoriesOwnerOnly(directory: Path) {
val missing = generateSequence(directory) { it.parent }.takeWhile { !Files.exists(it) }.toList().asReversed()
missing.forEach { path ->
try {
Files.createDirectory(path, OWNER_ONLY_DIRECTORY)
} catch (_: UnsupportedOperationException) {
Files.createDirectory(path)
}
}
}
}
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
package de.hoennig.gittally.commands
import de.hoennig.gittally.SecretFiles
import de.hoennig.gittally.git.GitService
import org.springframework.stereotype.Component
import picocli.CommandLine.Command
@@ -93,7 +94,7 @@ class InitCommand(
println("${file.toFile().relativeTo(normalizedWorkingDir.toFile())} already exists — not overwritten")
return
}
file.parent.toFile().mkdirs()
SecretFiles.createDirectoriesOwnerOnly(file.parent)
val content =
"""
# Machine- or user-specific overrides and secrets. Keys here win over .gittally.yml.
@@ -101,7 +102,9 @@ class InitCommand(
account: "${detected.account}" # technical username for git HTTPS authentication
token: "" # Gitea API token — never commit this
""".trimIndent()
file.toFile().writeText(content + "\n")
// this is where the operator pastes the Gitea token, so it must never exist
// world-readable — on a shared host that would hand out git push access
SecretFiles.writeOwnerOnly(file, content + "\n")
println("created ${file.toFile().relativeTo(normalizedWorkingDir.toFile())}")
}
@@ -214,7 +217,7 @@ class InitCommand(
return
}
val gittallyDir = root.resolve(".git/gittally")
gittallyDir.toFile().mkdirs()
SecretFiles.createDirectoriesOwnerOnly(gittallyDir)
val unitName = SystemdServiceFiles.unitName(root)
val unitFile = gittallyDir.resolve(unitName)
val envFile = gittallyDir.resolve(SystemdServiceFiles.ENV_FILE_NAME)
@@ -37,7 +37,8 @@ class GitService(
workingDir: Path = Paths.get("."),
) {
authenticated(workingDir) { environment ->
runner.runOrThrow(listOf("git", "fetch", "origin", branch), workingDir, environment)
// `--` guards against refnames starting with `-` being read as git options
runner.runOrThrow(listOf("git", "fetch", "origin", "--", branch), workingDir, environment)
}
}
@@ -142,7 +143,7 @@ class GitService(
workingDir: Path = Paths.get("."),
) {
if (refExists("refs/heads/$branch", workingDir)) {
runner.runOrThrow(listOf("git", "switch", branch), workingDir)
runner.runOrThrow(listOf("git", "switch", "--", branch), workingDir)
} else {
runner.runOrThrow(listOf("git", "switch", "--track", "-c", branch, "refs/remotes/origin/$branch"), workingDir)
}
@@ -152,6 +153,8 @@ class GitService(
branch: String,
workingDir: Path = Paths.get("."),
) {
// no `--` here: with paths `git reset --hard` refuses to run; the `origin/` prefix
// already keeps the argument from looking like an option
runner.runOrThrow(listOf("git", "reset", "--hard", "origin/$branch"), workingDir)
}
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
package de.hoennig.gittally.server
import de.hoennig.gittally.SecretFiles
import java.nio.file.Files
import java.nio.file.Path
import java.nio.file.attribute.PosixFilePermissions
import java.security.MessageDigest
import java.security.SecureRandom
@@ -25,16 +25,21 @@ class ControlTokenService(
?.let { return it }
}
val token = generateToken()
Files.createDirectories(tokenFile.parent)
Files.writeString(tokenFile, token + "\n")
restrictToOwner(tokenFile)
SecretFiles.createDirectoriesOwnerOnly(tokenFile.parent)
SecretFiles.writeOwnerOnly(tokenFile, token + "\n")
return token
}
/** Constant-time comparison; null or blank never matches. */
/**
* Constant-time comparison; null or blank never matches. Both sides are hashed first
* so the comparison always runs over two 32-byte buffers and cannot return early on a
* length mismatch — which would leak the token length.
*/
fun matches(submittedToken: String?): Boolean =
!submittedToken.isNullOrBlank() &&
MessageDigest.isEqual(submittedToken.toByteArray(), token().toByteArray())
MessageDigest.isEqual(sha256(submittedToken), sha256(token()))
private fun sha256(value: String): ByteArray = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256").digest(value.toByteArray())
/** 24 random bytes as hex, like legacy `openssl rand -hex 24`. */
private fun generateToken(): String {
@@ -42,12 +47,4 @@ class ControlTokenService(
SecureRandom().nextBytes(bytes)
return bytes.joinToString("") { "%02x".format(it) }
}
private fun restrictToOwner(file: Path) {
try {
Files.setPosixFilePermissions(file, PosixFilePermissions.fromString("rw-------"))
} catch (_: UnsupportedOperationException) {
// non-POSIX filesystem; the file stays with default permissions
}
}
}