Stop embedding the control token in every page (v0.9.10)
Closes TODO 2 of the security audit in docs/prs/2026-07-08-PR#000. Every rendered page carried the live control token in a meta tag so that gittally.js could send it, but no GET is authenticated — so `curl … | grep gittally-control-token` handed the token to anyone, and read access was effectively write access. Reading stays fully public, which is a requirement rather than an oversight: build states, logs and artifacts must be linkable from Gitea, chats or tickets without a login. Only the distribution of the token changed. The meta tag is gone; gittally.js keeps the token in localStorage and asks for it once per browser, so knowing it requires shell access to `.git/gittally/control-token` on the host. A token the server rejects is dropped and asked for once more, so a rotated secret is not a dead end. As a request header it stays inherently CSRF-safe. The five branches of that flow (first use, reuse, stale token, cancelled prompt, wrong token twice) were exercised against the real source with a throwaway node harness; the UI test now asserts the token does not appear in the rendered page. `docs/deployment.md` gained a "Control Token" section on the public-read/token-protected-write split. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ plugins {
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group = "de.hoennig"
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// bump at least the patch version for every deployment, so the UI footer
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// (BuildProperties) and --version identify what is actually running
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version = "0.9.9"
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version = "0.9.10"
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java {
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toolchain {
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